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SOME PENNSYLVANIA REAL PROPERTY LAW
COMMON LAW DOWER

It is a rather prevalent idea among students of law that
common law dower no longer exists in Pennsylvania. That
such dower is still existent, notwithstanding the Intestate
Act of June 7, 1917 (P. L. 429), is admirably illustrated in

the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Merrick vs.
DuPont, 132 Atl. Rep. (not yet officially reported).
Sections 1, 2(a), as amended by the act of July 11, 1917
(P. L. 755), and 3 are the pertinent sections of the Intestate
Act apparently replacing the old common law dower by a
statutory substitute. These sections provide as follows:
"Section 1. . ..
That the real and personal estate

of a decedent, whether male or female, remaining after payment of all just debts and legal charges, which shall not
have been sold, or disposed of by will, or otherwise limited
by marriage settlement, shall be divided and enjoyed as follows; namely-
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"Section 2(a). When such intestate shall leave a
spouse surviving and other kindred, but no issue, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to the real or personal estate, or both, to the aggregate value of $5000, and in addition, in the case of a widow, to the widow's exemption as
allowed by law. . . and in addition thereto shall be entitled to one-half the remaining real and personal estate...
"Section 3. The shares of the estate directed by this
act to be allotted to the widow shall be in lieu and full satisfaction of her dower at common law, so far as relates to
land of which the husband died siesed; and her share in
lands aliened by the husband in his life time, without her
joining in the conveyance, shall be the same as her share in
lands of which the husband died siesed."
In the instant case, Merrick, in 1902, sold certain real
estate but his wife, the present plaintiff, did not join in the
conveyance. His vendee sold it to Pierre S. DuPont, the
present owner of the property and one of the defendants.
The other defendant is his lessee for 999 years. In 1924
Merrick died, intestate and without issue, leaving his widow
and certain collateral relations to survive him. The widow
is suing for a $5,000 absolute interest in that real estate, and
also a fee simple estate in an undivided one-half of the balance and claims under the above provisions of the Intestate
Act of 1917. She has filed a bill in equity for partition and
the lower court entered a decree sustaining her claim and
the defendants have appealed.
It is to be noticed that the land was conveyed by the
husband prior to the effective date of the statute and his
death has occurred since that date. The defendant argues
that the act has no effect on land sold by a husband prior
to the act and dying after that date but is effective only as
to land sold since that time. This raises the question as to
whether the act of 1917 is to be given a retroactive effect.
The axiomatic principle of statutory interpretation relative
to retroactivity is quoted from the case of Phila., Balt., and
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Wash. R. Co. vs. Quaker City Flour Mills Co., 282 Pa. 362,
366, "that a statute shall always be interpreted so as to operate prospectively and not retrospectively unless the language is so clear as to preclude all question as to the intention of the legislature." The court then examines the
statute and prior cognate acts to discover the intention of
the legislature.
The plaintiff apparently contended that so much of
Section 1 as limits the right of distributees to lands "which
shall not have been sold" was only intended to exclude such
as had been sold and not conveyed. The court, however,
can find no justification for such a contention either in the
reports of the commissioners appointed to revise the prior
acts or in those acts themselves. Each of these statutes provided only for the distribution of the real and personal estate of decedents and this very patently excludes from
their purview, property which was not part of the estate of
the decedent, such as property sold and conveyed.
The court is also unable to find anything in the context of the act of 1917 which limits the natural meaning of
the words shall not have been sold to that contended for by
the plaintiff. Hence the court concludes that, not considering Section 3, the language of Section 1 must be construed
as have the other acts. In other words, the court finds that
the words shall not have been sold includes lands conveyed
by a husband without his wife's joinder. Thus we see that
by Section 1 the widow has no statutory interest in the
land now sought to be partitioned. It cites Borland vs.
Nichols, 12 Pa. 38, and Gray vs. McCune, 23 Pa. 447 as previous authority for this holding.
But they find by construing Section 3 without reference to Section 1 that a widow does have a statutory interest in lands aliened by her late husband, whether the sale
was made before or after the passage of the act.
Thus the court finds two contradictory provisions within the same act and the two cannot co-exist. This apparent
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difficulty is readily solved by treating the act as prospective
merely and as having no effect on lands aliened by the husband prior to the passage of the act. The widow will therefore have the statutory share in lands of which her husband
died siesed and in those sold by him since the passage of
the act of 1917. In those lands aliened by her husband
prior to the act without her joinder she will continue to
have her common law dower right. The court says that
this interpretation has the merits of according to the above
quoted rule of statutory interpretation, of avoiding a possible injustice to purchasers of land before the act was passed, and agrees with the heretofore existing course of common law.
Incidentally it is suggested that the proper procedure
for the plaintiff was not a bill in equity for partition but
the case is remitted without a definite decision on that
question.
The court alludes to the question of the constitutionality of any statute decreasing the interest of a purchaser
from a husband without a wife's joinder by increasing the
surviving wife's interest after his death but does not decide
the question since they hold that this statute does not have
that effect. Later, in discussing the merits of their interpretation of the act they say that it "avoids a possible injustice to purchasers of land before the act was passed."
This raises the interesting question as to the constitutionality of an act having that effect. Does the court's interpretation avoid a possible injustice or does it avoid the necessity of holding this portion of the act unconstitutional?
If not unconstitutional, a situation can easily be imagined where a purchaser's entire interest might be thus
wiped out in a day's time. A purchases land worth $4000
from B on March 1, and B's wife does not join in the conveyance. The present law allows her a dower interest of a
life estate in one-third of it should she outlive him. The next
day an act is passed by the legislature with provisions as in
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our present act. B then dies on the succeeding day, intestate, leaving his wife and collateral heirs to survive but no
issue. He has no estate. The widow claims her $5000
from the property sold. Thus A has had a few days' use of
the property for $4000. Would this be merely an injustice?
The question devolves to what did A buy when he
bought without the wife's joinder. Did he buy merely the
present use of the land subject to the future contingent interest of the wife whatever that might be at the husband's
death? Even under the present law his interest may be
decreased by the death of children without issue who were
living at the time of the purchase from the husband. His
interest is decreased from two-thirds of the property to
one-half. On the other hand, the purchaser's interest may
be increased by the birth of children or by the husband
making a will and thus denying the right to claim $5000.
If changeable by such extrinsic circumstances over which
the purchaser has no control, he may hardly be said to have
such a vested interest that the law cannot decrease it.
However, in other jurisdictions where the question has
arisen, it has been held uniformly that the wife cannot
benefit by a change in the law increasing her interest in her
husband's property to the detriment of a purchaser from
him without the wife's joinder. The courts of Indiana,
Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, and Missouri have all held such
acts unconstitutional as the deprivation of property without
due process of law.
Thus common law dower still exists in Pennsylvania
where the husband has aliened the property without his
wife's joinder prior to January 1, 1918, and dies after that
date.
DIVORCE AND ESTATE BY ENTIRETIES

In most states, a divorce or dissolution of the marriage
is regarded as terminating any tenancy by entireties if the
husband and wife have held any land in that manner. There-
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after the tenancy is a tenancy in common or a joint tenancy depending on the mode they would have held had they
been unmarried when the conveyance was made to them.
In these states, as a consequence of this view, partition of
the land may thereafter be had by either of them.
Pennsylvania, with but several other states, has held
that this tenancy remains unaltered by a subsequent divorce. This holding is based on the view that the character
of a tenancy is fixed at its inception and changes in fact or
relationship thereafter have no effect on it, Alles vs. Lyons,
216 Pa. 604; O'Malley vs. O'Malley, 272 Pa. 532.
Tenants by the entireties cannot secure a partition of
the land against the other. As a result, in this state, divorced parties have continued to hold property as concurrent owners. This continued business relationship between
divorced parties has proven unwise. This situation has
now been alleviated by the passage of an act permitting divorced tenants by entireties to compel a sale of such property and a division of the proceeds, Act of May 13, 1925
(P. L. 649). The sale is ordered on petition of either tenant by the court of equity. The act also provides that the
interest of each tenant shall be conclusively deemed to be
one-half of the value of the property. The act was a needed addition to our law and effectively counteracts the result brought about by the Supreme Court's decision that
such a tenancy was unaltered by divorce.
UNSEALED CONVEYANCES

Another important departure from our previous real
property law is found in Act of April 30, 1925, (P. L. 404).
This act is an amendment to Act of April 1, 1909 (P. L. 91).
Thruout the latter act where the word deed occurs the
present amendment adds thereto the words "or instrument
in writing for conveying or releasing land" and where
the word covenant appears by adding the words "or agreement."
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It also adds a new section to the amended act. This
section declares that all instruments in writing for conveying or releasing lands, signed as now required, but with no
seal affixed thereto, shall have the same force and effect as
though a seal were annexed and that such instruments
shall be deeds within purview of all acts of the Assembly
relating to deeds. The act is self-explanatory and is a forward step in emphasizing substance and ridding the law of
another decayed formalism.
THE WAYGOING CROP

In Pennsylvania alone is found the anomalous doctrine
of a tenant being allowed a waygoing crop. This right had
its origin in custom and at an early date had become so
prevalent that the courts treated its allowance as an implied agreement in the lease and refused to adhere to the
old common law.
The common law doctrine of England, usually adopted
in the United States, as laid down by Littleton is "that a
tenant for years, having a certain interest and knowing the
determination of it, has no right to the crop of grain sown
by him during the demise and coming to maturity after its
expiration."
The tenant who is in possession under a lease for years
or for any certain period is allowed this crop, Clark vs. Harvey, 54 Pa. 142. But he is entitled to this crop after the expiration of his tenancy only when he did not receive such a
crop at the commencement of his lease. In Stultz vs.
Dickey, 5 Binney 285 the court says that the right is based
on equitable principles for otherwise he would pay for a
full year without a full year's benefit of the ground. The
tenant is also entitled to the crop only when he has sown
the land in the preceding autumn with a crop which comes
to maturity in the following summer after the expiration of
the lease. Hence the doctrine has never been applied to
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any lease but one which began in the spring. The right is
applicable only to crops of grain.
The right of the tenant to the waygoing crop is considered as personal property and can be sold by him as can
other personal property. After such a sale by him, a cancellation of the lease will have no effect on the rights of the
purchaser, Shaw vs. Bowman, 91 Pa. 414.

SURFACE WATER DRAINAGE

A very important question in real property law is
whether the owner of land has a right to have surface water
drain off his land upon adjacent lower land, or whether the
owner of the lower land may make such improvements on
his land as will prevent the natural flow of surface water
thereon from the upper land without incurring liability.
One view, the so-called "civil law" rule, is that land on
which surface water naturally flows from other land is regarded as subject to a servitude of receiving such flow.
Consequently the owner of the land cannot prevent, either
by erections or improvements made in good faith, the escape on to his land of surface water from adjoining land.
The other view, the "common law" rule, is that the owner
of land has the right to make any use of his land, either by
erections or improvements thereon, regardless of the effect which these acts may have in preventing the flow of
surface water on to his land or in causing it to flow off on
to other land.
In Pennsylvania the "civil law" rule that the lower
owner may not obstruct the flowage of surface water is
approved but it has been regarded as inapplicable to property situated in cities and towns, where alterations in the
surface of lots are essential to their complete utilization
and are to be anticipated.
In Reilly vs. Stephenson, 222 Pa. 252 the court said,
"owners of lots in cities and towns, buy and own land with
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the manifest condition that the natural or existing surface
is liable to be changed by the progress of municipal development." The court also points out several restrictions on
this right to obstruct the natural flow of surface water. In
making the obstruction he must not proceed negligently
so as to do unnecessary damage to the adjacent owners.
Nor may he obstruct a natural channel for the flow of such
water or obstruct an artificial channel that has acquired
the character of an easement. Also, he may not gather the
water in a body and discharge it on the adjoining land.
Pennsylvania therefore recognizes both rules concerning the obstruction of surface water and applies the one or
the other as the land is situated in the country or in a city
or town.

LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT OF LAND
The general rule is that every landowner is entitled to
have his land supported in its natural state by the land adjoining and subjoining. The right of action for withdrawal
of such support has generally been held to accrue, not on
the withdrawal of the support, but on a subsidence resulting therefrom. In this, the rules relative to subjacent support are governed by the same principles as lateral support.
But Pennsylvania, singularly, has held that the cause of action in the case of the withdrawal of subjacent support,
dates from the time of the withdrawal of that support and
not from any subsidence resulting therefrom.
In Noonan vs. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, the court, through
Mr. Justice Dean says, "where there has been a horizontal
division of the land, the owner of the subjacent estate, coal,
or other mineral, owes to the superincumbent owner, a
right of support. This is an absolute right arising out of
the ownership of the surface. . . When coal was removed without leaving sufficient pillars, or without supplying artificial props, was the time when the subjacent owner
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failed in that absolute duty he owed his neighbor above.
And from that, dates the cause of action."
It would appear from the case that the right of the
superjacent owner to go below the surface at any time to
see if the subjacent owner were performing his duty of support was quite a factor in influencing the court's decision.
They also remark that the risk of having the support
withdrawn unknown to the surface owner is a factor in
setting the price for such properties. A fear is expressed
that the opposite view would unduly encourage the buying
of such property for speculative purposes.
The result of such a holding is of course that the right
of action in the surface owners will be barred in six years
regardless of whether or not an actual subsidence has occurred. Thus the surface owner, for the mere violation of
his right without actual damage, could recover but nominal
damages and would also be met with the difficulty of proving the support insufficient when no actual subsidence had
occurred. Later, should actual damage to a large extent
occur, he would be left remediless. This holding has been
severely criticized by various writers.
The case also seems to be at variance with another
general rule. It is usually held that after a right of action
has accrued to a landowner, a sale of the land will not pass
such right of action to the grantee. But the present case
held that the right to sue passes to a grantee of the land
and is available to him unless the action has been barred by
the statute of limitations.
That this doctrine is applicable only to cases of subjacent support and that where lateral support has been removed the cause of action dates from the actual subsidence
and not the withdrawal of support is shown in Pollack vs.
Pittsburgh, Bessemer and Lake Erie R. R. Co., 275 Pa. 467.
The court distinguishes the case of Noonan vs. Pardee,
200 Pa. 474 from the instant one by saying that there is a
substantial difference between subjacent support and lat-
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eral support. In the former the surface owner has a right
and is under a duty to take notice of the withdrawal of
support but adjoining owners have not such interrelated
rights as would compel an owner to know what the adjoining owner is doing or about to do, its effect when completed, and whether, in the course of time, it might possibly result to his injury or to the injury of his property.
This distinction is a very nice one and it would seem
that the duty of inspection as to withdrawal of support
might more reasonably and equitably be placed on adjoining owners than on the superjacent owners, if on any. Removal of lateral support is more readily seen and the possible inadequacy of artificial support can be better estimated by the ordinary person than where subjacent support
is removed.
The case also holds that successive actions may be
brought for each subsidence of the soil, though only one
excavation has been made. The court is evidently not entirely satisfied with the case of Noonan vs. Pardee, and refuses to logically extend its doctrine to the analogous situation of lateral support.
POLLUTION OF STREAMS

The "Sanderson case" is one of the best known cases
in Pennsylvania law, but that its application is often misconstrued can be noted from the frequent litigation on the
subject and the various doctrines it is cited as upholding.
The case of McCune vs. Pittsburgh and B. C. Co., 238 Pa.
83, contains an exoteric discussion of the application of the
Sanderson case. The court says the Sanderson case decided
"that an owner of coal lands can mine his coal in the usual
and ordinary way, and in such operation allow the water, as
it comes from the mine, to flow naturally into a stream of
pure water without liability to a lower riparian owner for
the pollution of the stream

.

.

.

and can pump mine
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water to the surface and allow it to seek its natural outlet,
without liability for damage if the water of the stream is
already polluted."
The court points out that it is an exception to the general rule that a riparian owner has no right to pollute the
water of a stream and, since an exception, it is to be strictly
confined to the limits set in the Sanderson case. Another
restriction pointed out was that the rule is only applicable
where an unreasonable expenditure is need to obviate the
pollution.
The attention of the Supreme Court was again directed
to the Sanderson case in the recent case of the Penna. R. R.
et al, vs. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233. Here an injunction was sought against the coal company by the railroad
and several water companies for the pollution of a stream.
The coal company invoked the rule in the Sanderson case
and claimed that by that case they had a property right to
pollute the stream. They also claimed that the use of the
water by the railroad for supplying its engines and by companies, without the power of eminent domain, in supplying
various towns with water was not a public use of the water.
The court answered the latter argument first and held
that the use of the water was a public one. Use of the
water by the railroad for supplying engines engaged in the
common carriage of passengers and freight was an integral
part of that carriage and partook of its public nature. The
water companies were serving approximately 75,000 consumers and the fact that they possessed no power of eminent domain was immaterial in determining their character
and the fact that they served so many consumers determinative of their use of the water as a public one.
The court distinguishes the Sanderson case and says
that that case did not involve the rights of the public to the
waters of a stream. The former case was decided on a balance of the "necessities of a great public industry" and
"mere personal inconvenience."
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The court points out that here the right of the public is
concerned. The situation would be the same were a large
number of lower riparian owners the complaintants of the
pollution. The use of the water by many people makes the
use a public one and not the fact of how the water is taken
from the stream for their use. The present case calls for
the application of the rule that there can be no prescriptive
right acquired if the act is a public nuisance.
The coal company's property right of pollution is denied for the Sanderson case merely took the act of pollution
out of the class of public nuisances but gave no property
right. That case was one of privilege merely.
The court kindly endeavors to ease the wound of the
defendant by requiring the plaintiff's to cooperate with the
defendant in the removal of the mine water over the former's land.
Thus we see that there can be no "privilege" of polluting a stream of water where that pollution is detrimental
to the public use of that stream.
ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT TO PURCHASE REAL
PROPERTY

In Dobkins vs. Landsberg et ux, 273 Pa. 174, the interesting question is presented whether or not a vendee who
has made a contract to purchase a property subject to a
mortgage can assign the contract without the consent of
the vendor. The assignee of the vendee contends that the
vendee's liability for the mortgage would still exist notwithstanding the assignment and hence he can have no objection to the assignment. The vendor insists that by the
assignment of the contract he will lose th& personal liability of the vendee and therefore the contract is not assignable.
The court points out that no case has been found where
the personal liability of the vendee taking under and sub-
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ject to a mortgage has been enforced against one, who had
not actually taken over the real estate in controversy. The
court does not decide whether the basis of the obligation
to indemnify is on the working of equitable principles or on
the theory of implied contract but says the result is that
the one who has the property is obligated to indemnify the
vendor against losses from existing mortgages. The court
suggests that since all prior agreements merge into the
deed, the liability of the vendee would be destroyed but
points out that this is a matter of intention and need not
of necessity occur.
Due to the failure of the plaintiff to join all the necessary parties to the action, the case is remanded on that
ground. The court seems to intimate that a contract to
purchase a property under and subject to a mortgage is not
assignable.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF LAND CONTRACTS

As a general rule, specific performance of a contract to
purchase land may be had, under certain circumstances, by
either the vendor or vendee in a court of equity. But in
Pennsylvania, while the vendee may secure specific performance in equity, the vendor must bring his action at law
unless he seeks to recover something other than the purchase money. This was decided in Smaltz's Appeal, 99 Pa.
310. The reason given is that equity will grant relief only
where the remedy at law is inadequate and if 'the purchase
money alone is sought the remedy at law is adequate.
But the action at law on the contract to recover the
purchase money is in legal effect a bill in equity for specific
performance and is governed by the same equitable principles, Hoover ef al, exrs., vs. Pontz, 271 Pa. 285.
ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHT OF RE-ENTRY

In England it has been held since a very early date that
the right to re-enter for the breach of a condition is not as-
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signable. This holding was based on the statute against
maintenance and because of the mode of conveyencing in
England. But in McKissick vs. Pickle, 16 Pa. 140 the Supreme Court held that since the statute against maintenance was never in force here nor the mode of conveyancing
the same, that there is no policy of the law forbidding such
an assignment. Hence the right of the grantor to re-enter
for a broken condition can be sold on execution against him
or the grantor may sell or devise the right either before or
after the condition is broken. Thus a mere possibility may
be validly sold in Pennsylvania.
HIGHWAY PURPOSES

Pennsylvania courts have made a distinction between
use of city streets by public service companies and the
same use by them of rural roads. In the case of city streets
it has been held that legitimate highway purposes includes
travel by electric and steam railways and the laying of gas,
water or sewerage pipes, and the owner can not recover additional compensation than that which he received for the
opening of the street, Dempster vs. Traction Co. 205 Pa. 70.
Where the same use has been made of roads not within
the limits of a town or city, it has been held that such a use
by public service companies is not a customary or natural
use for highway purposes and hence constitutes an additional burden on the property for which compensation must
be paid, Sterling's Appeal, 111 Pa. 35; Dempster vs. Traction Co., 205 Pa. 70, Pa. R. R. Co. vs. Mont. Co. Pass. Rwy.
Co., 167 Pa. 62.
HIGHWAY AS AN INCUMBRANCE

Ordinarily the existence of a public highway across a
piece of land is considered such a right as will constitute a
breach of a covenant against incumbrances in a deed. In
Wilson vs. Cochran, 46 Pa. 229, it was said that public roads
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are laid out by authority of law in pursuance of the policy
of Penn who allowed every grantee of property an additional six acres in every hundred as -compensation for future roads. The title to the land is not taken but remains
as before and the public merely has a right of passage.
Since roads are usually beneficial to adjoining property, it
will be presumed to be a benefit rather than an incumbrance and if not a benefit the court will presume that the
parties estimated the detriment of the highway in adjusting
the price to be paid. Thus the presence of a public highway over the land is not an incumbrance within the meaning of a covenant against incumbrances.
TITLE TO PROPERTY BY ESTOPPEL

In Root vs. Crock, 52 Pa. 359, the question arose when
an after-acquired title will inure to the benefit of a former
grantee of the property, an attempted conveyance having
been made when the grantor had no title. The court held
that the estoppel will operate against grantor wherever he
purported to convey an interest which he did not have. This
estoppel will operate even without a warranty or even
where the person sought to be estopped merely joined in
the conveyance of the wife, to validate it.
In Gallagher vs. Stern, 250 Pa. 292 the same question
relative to a mortgage arose. It was decided that where
mortgagor includes in the mortgage, property which he
does not own but which he later acquires, the mortgage
will bind the after-acquired property as between the mortgagor and mortgagee but not as against subsequent judgment creditors without notice. The court bases its latter
conclusion on the fact that creditors searching the record
would search only from the date on which the mortgagor
acquired title and not prior thereto. The mortgagee can
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not complain for he might have protected himself by
searching the record to discover the extent of the mortgagor's ownership. In order to bind these subsequent judgment creditors either actual notice or a second recordation
of the mortgage is necessary.
HAROLD SEATON IRWIN.
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MOOT COURT
NICHOLS VS. JEFFERS
Suggestion as to Amount of
Practice, Common Pleas - Trial Damages That Should be Awarded in Accident CaseWithdrawal of Juror

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Suit for damages for injuries for a collision between two automobiles. Nichols was greatly hurt. Alleging the negligence of defendant, the counsel of Nichols argued that for the loss of an eye,
he should get $5,000, and for the loss of aft arm he should get $5,000
more, and that the evidence would have made a verdict for $10,000

not excessive or extraordinary. The court, despite the defendant's
request declined to withdraw a juror. Verdict for $11,000. Appeal.
Lyons, for Plaintiff.

S. McInroy, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Miller, Harry, J. Improper remarks made by counsel to jury are
grounds for withdrawal of a juror. The reason assigned is that such
remarks tend to prejudice the minds of the jury, 228 Pa. 610; 169 Pa.1.
Plaintiff contends that the refusal to withdraw a juror is not
reversible error. Plaintiff admits that an error was made. They
maintain that it is not reversible. We cannot accept this view of it.
We are of the opinion that the remarks of plaintiff's counsel tended
to prejudice the minds of the jury. In such a case it -is proper for
the court to withdraw a juror upon request by the opposing counsel,
230 Pa. 366. Further it makes no difference who is the utterer of the
improper matter, 228 Pa. 610.
Plaintiff asks that a line be drawn between improper remarks
and the remarks made in the case at bar. The court is unable to do
so because it finds that the estimating of the amount of damages
expected to be returned by the jury, when made by a counsel is an
improper remark, 163 Pa. 253.
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We are of the opinion that the case of Connelly vs. Pittsburgh
Railway Co. in 230 Pa. 366 is a case on point. In that case counsel
for the plaintiff argued as to the amount of damages plaintiff should
recover, and the court there held that it was error and withdrew a
juror.
Further cases that support the proposition that improper remarks made to jury by counsel are grounds for the withdrawal of a
juror are 240 Pa. 255, 215 Pa. 226, 43 Super. 61, and 270 Pa. 77.
In view of the foregoing arguments and authorities cited sustaining them, the court reverses the judgment of the court below and orders the case remanded to the common pleas court for a new trial.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The counsel for plaintiff in his argument, stated an estimate of
damages, for eye and arm, amounting to $10,000. Was it error in
the court to allow this statement? In such cases, the courts are
sensitive as to the feebleness of juror's minds, and the undue influence on them, which the opinion and reasonings of counsel may have.
No opinion of counsel as to the damages proper to allow should be
expressed, Joyce vs. Smith, 269 Pa. 439; Quinn vs. P. R. R. Co., 224
Pa. 162.
For this breach of duty the court should withdraw the case from
the further consideration of the jury. To withdraw a juror, is to
withdraw the case from the jury's further consideration.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

TAYLOR VS. HENDRICKS
Principal and Agent - Selling of Real Estate - Commission Due
from Agent to Broker, for Securing Buyer for Agent who

Has Not Authority to Sell for Undisclosed PrincipalSt. of Frauds Has No Application

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hendricks was attorney for Johnson, in several pieces of business. He conceived that Johnson ought to dispose of a certain piece
of land, but had been unable to convince him. He thinks that if he
could secure a purchaser for it, at the price of $55.000, Johnson's reluctance could be convinced. He, therefore, not saying for whom
he was acting employed Taylor to find a buyer at that price. Taylor
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has done so, but Johnson has refused to make the conveyance.
Taylor brings this action for the broker's commission.
Tomkins, for Plaintiff.
Beard, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Shenkman, J. We feel that the sole question to be decided is
whether Hendricks had authority to act for Johnson, and if not, is
Taylor justified in bringing this suit against Hendricks instead of
Johnson.
From the facts of the case we cannot see where Hendricks was
clothed with any authority to act for Johnson in this transaction, as
it is clearly and concisely stated in the facts that Hendricks only
thought that he could persuade Johnson to dispose of the property.
The fact that Hendricks believed or had good reasons to b6lieve that
Johnson would approve of the sale does not satisfy us that Hendricks
had any authority to act.
There is a well defined principle of law which is strictly adhered
to in this Commonwealth which states that an undisclosed principal
can be sued if he has ratified the act of the agent. In the case at
bar Hendricks did not tell Taylor for whom he was acting. These
facts enclose the case at bar within the above stated rule of undisclosed principal. But as Johnson did not ratify the act, Taylor has
no cause of action against him.
In Campbell vs. Wade, 83 Super. 415, it is held that a real estate
broker employed to sell certain property is entitled to his commission where he has procured a purchaser who is able, ready, and willing to buy at terms of principal, and that the principal prevented a
consummation of the sale. Applying this doctrine to the case in issue,
we find that since Hendricks had no authority, the plaintiff may recover from Hendricks.
The plaintiff secured a purchaser and had done all that was required to earn the commission. That others in interest would not
join is immaterial, the defendant having agreed to sell a fee, should
have been certain that others would join before entering the transaction. This rule of law is very ably cited in a recent case,-that of
Aber vs. Penn Co. for Insurance of Lives, 269 Pa. 384.
In answer to the second defence that the contract was oral and
therefore not binding, since it was an assumption of the liability of
another secured by parol, the court feels that the case of Lieberman
vs. Colahon, 267 Pa. 102 applies. In that case it was decreed that a
man may by a parol contract render himself liable as an original
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debtor for work done upon the property of another. So, one having
charge of real estate as an attorney may by a special oral agreement
obligate himself personally to pay a commission for its sale, provided
that such agreement is original and not collateral to a primary obligation created by or on behalf of the owner. The contract between
Taylor and Hendricks was an original undertaking as affecting them
alone, and not as a secondary obligation as between the vendor and
vendee, and being such, did not affect any primary obligation created
by or on behalf of the owuer.
Therefore, the court affirms the judgment of the lower court in
granting relief to the plaintiff.

OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
When Hendricks employed Taylor, he had no authority from
Johnson, nor has Johnson done anything to ratify the act. He has
not made a sale of the land to the purchaser discovered by Taylor,
nor indeed done anything on account of Taylor's discovery. Here is no
visible ground for imputing liability to him. The statute requiring
assumptions of the debts of others by X to be manifested by writing,
has no application.
But Hendricks has employed Taylor who has done what a broker
binds himself to do. He has found one who would buy and at the
price. The failure of the sale to become effected, is due to Hendricks
not having ability to secure the sale. But he has got from Taylor
what he purchased, his skill and industry, in finding and making
known one willing to purchase.
There is.no reason for denying to Taylor the customary compensation. The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

HAMILTON VS. STOKES
Easements

-

Creation of An Easement by One Having Equitable
Title Only -- Necessity of Notice

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A owned in fee a lot on which he erected a hotel. At the distance of a quarter of a mile, there was an elevated piece of ground
belonging to P. A contracted to buy this piece of land, and before
getting a deed constructed on the land a reservoir into which he conducted water from mountain streams. From this reservoir he built a
channel to the hotel. This channel ran thru lands of several persons,
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whose permission was only orally given. At A's death, the hotel lot
was sold to Hamilton, and A's equity in the mountain lot was sold to
Stokes. Stokes has interrupted the channel and denies the right of
Hamilton to maintain the reservoir on his lot, and to take water
from it.
This is a bill for an injunction against interfering with the abduction of water from the reservoir.
Potamkin, for Plaintiff.
Reddy, for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT
Royal, J. The main question in the case is whether the equitable
owner of one piece of land can subject it to an easement in favor of
another piece of land which he owns in fee, so that purchasers of
the first piece of land will be bound by that easement. Had A had
the legal title to the reservoir lot at the time he erected the reservoir, there are a large number of authorities holding that the purchaser of the servient land is bound by the easement, Koons vs. McNanee, 6 Super. 499; Grace Methodist Church vs. Dobbins, 113 Pa. 297.
But the learned counsel for the defendant contends that an easement
cannot be created upon land to which land the creator has but an
equitable title. Under the contract A became the equitable owner
of the reservoir lot, and the vendor was but a trustee of the legal
title for A, holding it as security for the payment of the purchase
price agreed upon by the parties. Inasmuch as the vendor's interest
was solely in the payment of the purchase price, the vendee, A, could
do with that land what he willed as tho he had acquired the legal
title, and subject only to the right of the vendor to compel specific
performance of the contract, the court assuming that the contract
was in writing, Richter vs. Selin, 8 S. & R. 440.
The fact that the hotel was distant from the reservoir lot does
not alter the situation, as the dominent land does not have to be contiguous to the servient, In re Private Road, 1 Ashm. 417; Cady vs.
Springfield Water Works Co., 134 N. Y. 118, 31 N. E. 245.
The counsel for the plaintiff claims that at the time the defendant bought the equity in the reservoir lot A held both the legal and
the equitable title to the same, but such was not the case. However
in the opinion of the court, the result is the same, and the doctrine
of estoppel does not apply as the use made of the easement was open,
notorious and continuous. The term "continuous use" has been defined as a use not interrupted by the act of the owner of the land or
by voluntary abandonment by the party claiming the right, 19 C. J.
882. Under such circumstances notice is unnecessary, Rhawn vs.
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Edge Hill Furnace Co., 201 Pa. 637; Wissler vs. Hershey, 23 Pa. 333.
The case of Anania vs. Serenta, 275 Pa. 474, is practically on al fours
with the present case, in which Kephart, J., said in an able and enlightening opinion in grantin4 the injunction, "The law imputes to a
purchaser knowledge of facts which he would have acquired by the
exercise of ordinary intelligence. Notice is unnecessary where the
fact is equally within the knowledge of both parties, and it must be
considered as such where the sources of information are equally accessible to both."
Upon due consideration of the facts, this court has come to the
conclusion that the injunction should be granted, and it is so ordered.

OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
A owned the hotel, and equitably owned the hill on which he constructed a dam. The water from this hill was conducted to the hotel.
When the hotel was sold to H, there was an implied creation of an
easement, in its favor, upon the hill reservoir. That there was a distance between them is immaterial They both belonged to the same
person, and one was by him subjected to the rendering of a permanent service.to the other.
The reservoir was of use to the hotel, only by means of the channels, by which its water was conveyed to the hotel. That those
channels were available only with the consent of the owner of the
land through which they went is unimportant. The buyer of the
hotel bought the right to maintain the dam and basin, and to use its
water by the channel so long as the intercepting land was no obstacle.
When Stokes bought the mountain lot he saw that it was servient
to the hotel, and his title must be held charged with a duty to suffer
the continuance of the hotel's use of the water. He has no right to
prevent such uses. The court has properly granted an injunction
against his interference with the use of the reservoir. Cf. Anania vs.
Serenta, 275 Pa. 474. The appeal is dismissed.

BARTIN VS. HOPPER
Foreign Attachment - Property Within Jurisdiction is Sufficient to
Maintain Proceedings-Debts and Choses in Action-Debts
to Garnishee After Return of Writ Not Attachable
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Stokes made monthly purchases of sugar from Hopper, a whole-
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sale dealer, doing business in New York. The sugar arrived about
the beginning of the month, a day or two before or after. On August
15th, Bartin, a resident of New York, anticipating the early organization of a new debt, began assumpsi in Philadelphia and named
Stokes as garnishee, in respect of the debt due by him to Hopper. No
debt then existed but two weeks after the service of attachment on
Stokes, he received a quantity of sugar for which he owned $375.
Court directed a verdict in favor of Hopper for want of jurisdiction.
Kilmer, for Plaintiff.
Mendelsohn, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Johnston, H., J. The writ of foreign attachment is a proceeding
against property and the thing to be attached must be within the
jurisdiction of the Court, Act of June 21st, 1911, P. L. 1097.
The question in this case is, whether the Court had jurisdiction
to maintain garnishment proceedings against Hopper, defendant and
Stokes, garnishee, on a debt existing at time of service of attachment on Stokes.
Jurisdiction to levy on debts and choses in action by process of
garnishment rests on the ability to serve the writ on the debtor of the
defendant within the jurisdiction of the court issuing the process, but
in such a case there must be a debt or chose in action on which the
attachment will operate through the garnishee. Where there is no
debtor of the defendant in the foreign attachment, no chose in action
within reach of Court's process, there can be no garnishment, Falk
Co. vs. American Ry. Express, 79 Super. 99.
Where a further performance of a contract is necessary before
payment thereon becomes due, the payment is conditioned on the
performance, and is not subject to garnishment until the condition
has been fulfilled. This rule is based on the principle that, "As the
plaintiff can have no greater right against the garnishee than the
defendant would have, and can occupy no better position with respect
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to the garnishee, it follows that, where a contract between the defendant and garnishee had not been fully performed by defendant at
time of attachment by the plaintiff, the garnishee is not chargeable,"
2 A. L. R. 506; Furness vs. Smith, 30 Pa. 520.
Whenever property subsequently comes into the hands of the
person named as garnishee in a writ of foreign attachment, and who,
at the time of the service of the writ, owed nothing to the defend ant,
said named garnishee is not affected by such process, Falk vs. American Ry. Express Co., supra.
Furthermore, in case of foreign attachment, the affidavit must
set out a good cause of action and such facts as give the Court jurisdiction; and must not be ambiguous nor depend upon conjecture or
inference, Mindlin et al vs. Saxony Co. et al., 261 Pa. 354; McLeod
vs. Hyman, 272 Pa. 582; U. S. Mills Co. vs. Max Fishel, Inc., 4 D. &
C. 751.
In this case no debt existed between Stokes and Hopper at the
time of the service of the writ of attachment on Stokes. Hopper
could not have maintained an action against Stokes, nor received anything at time of service of attachment, for Stokes was not then indebted to Hopper. The plaintiff's right is no greater than that of the
defendant against the garnishee; the defendant had no right of action against the garnishee. The garnishee can be held only to the
extent of the defendant's claim against him. The debt which subsequently arose between Stokes and Hopper was not affected by the
attachment which was served on Stokes prior to the incurring of the
debt. Moreover, the plaintiff's cause of action was based upon conjecture - that some day, some debt would arise between the defendant, Hopper, and the named garnishee, Stokes. The Court does not
have jurisdiction to maintain garnishment proceedings when cause is
based on such grounds.
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In view of the foregoing reasons, the decree of the lower Court,
directing a verdict in favor of the defendant for want of jurisdiction
is affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Hopper is a resident of New York. So is Bartin. But, their being residents of the same state, is no obstacle to the maintenance by
one of them, of a foreign attachment in Pennsylvania against the
other.
But, the attachment is of property, which may be chattels or
choses in action. If a debt from Stokes to Hopper then existed, that
debt could be attached. But no debt then existed. There was no
property of Hopper in the custody or possession of Stokes. That
there would shortly be a debt was anticipated. But, an anticipated
debt, even though the expectation is shortly fulfilled, is no property,
and is not attachable. The opinion of the learned court below well
expounds this principle, and its conclusion is supported by Falk Company vs. Am. Ry. Express Co., 79 Super. 99.
The judgment in favor of the defendant and of the garnishee is
affirmed.

HOFFER VS. CADWELL
Bargain and Sale -

General Warranty -

in Law

-

Eviction Necessary

What Constitutes a Breach
-

Possession

Must Be Disturbed

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Cadwell conveyed a lot to Hoffer for $3,000. The deed contained
the covenant of general warranty. Hoffer took possession which he
has retained ever since. He has at length in six years discovered that
the land did not belong to Cadwell, but to a party in Nova Scotia.
Hoffer now sues on the covenant of warranty, demanding a return of
the purchase money with interest.
Sobel, for Plaintiff.
Stadler, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Stayton, J. The doctrine has long been recognized in this state
as well as elsewhere that in order to maintain an action upon a coy-
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enant of general warranty an eviction must be averred and proved,
Knepper vs. Kurtz, 58 Pa. 480. The eviction necessary, is required to
be actual. Constructive eviction according to the weight of authority
in this state, is not sufficient as the counsel for the defendant very
ably contends. We do not construe the rule as meaning that the
party need wait to be actually turned out of possession by process of
law. He may surrender when the result is clearly inevitable and still,
in the eyes of the law he is evicted.
While the contention of the plaintiff, namely, "that a covenant of
warranty in a deed is an undertaking to compensate the grantee in
money if the title to the property fails," is undoubtedly a correct
statement of the law as applied in*some jurisdictions, such a rule
conflicts with the weight of authority in Pennsylvania. The court
disagreed with that proposition in Strong vs. Nesbitt, 267 Pa. 291 when
it said, "The damage in an action on a covenant of general warranty, contained in a deed, is not the defect of title in the title granted
but an actual eviction, consequent on it."
Then in Williams vs. O'Donnell, 225 Pa. 321, the court declared,
"Between the covenants implied in the words 'grant, bargain and sell'
and a special covenant of warranty, there is no inconsistency whatever and the function and operation of each are clearly distinguished.
That the covenant of general warranty runs with the land and is in
this respect distinguishable from the implied covenants, is a principle too familiar to call for any citation of authorities." Whatever
else it may be, it is beyond all dispute, a covenant against eviction,
is not broken until there is an actual or constructive eviction under
a party holding a paramount title, Patton vs. McFarlane, 3 Penrose & Watts 419.
We are of the decided opinion that the cases and authorities on
which the plaintiff bases his contention, have no relevancy whatsoever to the law of this state. Furthermore, the counsel for the plaintiff alleges a breach of the covenant of general warranty but fails altogether to prove the most essential element of the breach, namely,
the eviction by one holding a paramount title.
The mere fact that the title is vested in some third person can
not in itself constitute a breach. It may operate as a lien against
the property; but the mere existence of a lein gives no right of action, Herbert vs. Trust Co., 269 Pa. 306. Should the lien-holder seek
to enforce his lien or even threaten its enforcement, the situation
would be materially altered, for its satisfaction by due process of law,
would probably result in an eviction of the plaintiff.
In the opinion of this court, the only plausible ground of appeal,
that is possible for the plaintiff, would seem to be on the theory that
the lien, or defect in title did in fact amount to a constructive evic-
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tion but we find even this theory untenable. With the collapse of
this last contention, the plaintiff"s case must faiL Accordingly, we
must enter a non-suit against the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Little need be said, in this case. The covenant of warranty is not
broken by the fact that the title conveyed is bad. It is a covenant
not that the title is good, but that, good or bad, the grantee will not
lose the possession by its assertion. "The gravamen" says Gibson
C. J. "therefore is not the defect of title but the eviction consequent
upon it," Stewart vs. West, 14 Pa. 336; Knepper vs. Kurtz, 58 Pa.
480; Strong vs. Nesbitt, 267 Pa. 294.
Here the plaintiff has had the possession of the land ever since
his purchase. There has been no eviction, actual or constructive. A
"party in Nova Scotia" is said to own the land, but he has made no
gesture indicative of a purpose to obtain possession of it. The conclusion of the learned court below is correct. The plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Affirmed.

MAGIS VS. CLINTON
Negotiable Instruments - Promissory Notes - Demand Notes
Demand Must be Made Within Reasonable Time Reasonable Time

-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
X made a promissory note payable to Y or order for three
hundred dollars on demand. This note was indorsed by Clinton before delivery to Y. No steps were taken to enforce payment for
twenty-seven months, when demand was made on X and notice of
non-payment was given by the notary to Clinton. The present holder
of the note sues Clinton. The court has allowed a recovery of the
value of the note plus interest on that sum from the time demand for
payment was made on Clinton.
Auerbach, for Plaintiff.
Cramer, for Defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Crisman, J. Section 71 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1901
P. L. 194 provides that where a note is payable on demand, "presentment must be made within a reasonable time." As to what constitutes
this reasonable time we must look to section 193 of the same act
which says, "in determining what is a reasonable time or an unreasonable time, regard is to be had to the nature of the instrument, the
usage of trade or business with respect to such instruments, and the
facts of the particular case."
In the case of Muncy Borough School District vs. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. 464 the court held that what was a reasonable time
within which to present a draft or bill of exchange, was a question of
law to be determined under the circumstances of the case by the
court.
Murray vs. Grover, 80 Super. 56 holds that where there are no
qualifying circumstances shown and no explanations are offered for
the delayed presentation of the note twenty-three months after its
issuance was not presentation within a reasonable time.
Let us look and see if there are any explanations given for not
presenting the note before. According to the facts of the case the
plaintiff, the last holder of the note, after making a demand upon the
maker of the note had the notary notify the defendant, Clinton, who
was merely an accommodation indorser, of the non-payment of the
note and soon after brought suit thereon. There is certainly no qualifying circumstance to be found here by which we might be able to
forgive a delay such as the one in the present case. Neither can we
find where the plaintiff has attempted any explanation for his delay.
Therefore in view of the fact that no explanations have been offered and there are no qualifying conditions, twenty-seven months is
an unreasonable time to hold a promissory note payable on demand,
and presentment after such a period would not be such a presentment
as would come under section 71 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
which provides for the presentment of a note payable on demand
within a reasonable time. Judgment reversed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Had a day for payment been designated in the note, demand on
that day would have been necessary in order to bind the indorser.
When a note is payable on demand, presentment for payment
must be made in a reasonable time after the issue of note in order
to perfect the indorser's liability. Were then, the demand for payment, twenty-seven months after issue, and notice of non-payment
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etc., to the indorser, early enough?

The cases cited justify the con-

clusion that they were not. Explanation of the delay is not given, so
that, were a satisfactory explanation possible, its imagination can be
of no service. Murray vs. Grover, 80 Super. 56, and cases there cited,
warrant the decision of the learned court below. Judgment affirmed.

SARTORI VS. HAMMOND
Hotel

-

Innkeepers in Room

-

Responsibility for Stolen Goods, Articles left
Act of June 12, 1913, P. L 481

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant kept a hotel at which Sartori became a guest. He was
assigned to a room into which he took his satchel and overcoat, in
which he had a comb, brush, toothbrush, collar, and similar articles.
In the morning he locked the room, leaving these things in the room.
He returned at noon, when on going to his room, he discovered that
his property was missing. He values the property at $125, and brings
trespass. No explanation of the abstraction of the articles is given.
Nothing indicates negligence of the defendant. The court told the
jury there might be a recovery without such negligence unless the
plaintiff was shown to be negligent, and no such evidence came in the
case. Verdict for $125.
K. Wren, for Plaintiff.
E. Curtiss. for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT
Gerofsky, J. The relationship of innkeeper and guest having
arisen from the assignment of a room to Sartori, the defendant
thereby undertook all the liabilities of an innkeeper under the existing law. The common law, as defined by the Act of May 7, 1855,
P. L. 479, clearly made the innkeeper liable as an insurer for the
goods and property of his guests, and therefor no negligence need be
alleged nor proved, Honser vs. Tully, 62 Pa. 92; Walsh vs. Porterfield, 87 Pa. 376; Shultz vs. Wall, 134 Pa. 262. This being so, the
only question for the decision of this court is whether this liability
was affected or changed by the Act of June 12, 1913, P. L. 481. We
think it was not.
The articles sued for in this case are not money, jewels, etc., so
as to fall within the first section of this act. The fact that it does
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not affirmatively appear that the innkeeper had posted the notices
required by this section also takes it out of the statute. Section 2
applies only to special arrangements made with the innkeeper and
Section 3 only to goods actually delivered to the innkeeper for safekeeping, so they are of no moment in this case.
Section 4 presents an ambiguous meaning to any superficial
reading but we note that in limiting the liability of the innkeeper to
that of a depository for hire, a locatio custodian bailment, so called,
the act applies to "personal property placed in the possession of the
innkeeper and under his care," with the proviso that such liability
shall not exceed a certain sum. Sartori's property was not placed
by him under the innkeeper's care since it was retained by him in his
own room. The property was not of such a sort that required delivery to the innkeeper but on the other hand we think that he had the
right to expect full protection from intrusion and removal of his
goods while he was temporarily absent. Section 4 is therefor inapplicable and the proviso not affective.
Since. the Act of 1913 does not change the law as applicable to
the instant case, the innkeeper's liability exists entirely independent
of any negligence and we can find no error in the court's instructions
to the jury. The decision of the learned court below, we think, is
sufficiently supported by the case of Franchina vs. Palumbo, 79 Super.
234 and it is therefore affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The careful opinion of the learned court below dispenses us from
the necessity of an extended discussion of the case. The articles
stolen were such as the guest had a right to have in the room assigned to him. He was not obliged to stay in the room or, leaving it, to
do otherwise than he did. He locked the door, and retained the key.
In a like case, Orlady, P. J., has said, "The innkeeper, as the articles properly retained by guests in their room, is practically in the
position of an insurer while the guest remains in his house," Franchina vs. Calumbo, 79 Super. 234. No negligence of the innkeper is
necessary to make him such insurer. Cf. also Schultz vs. Wall, 134
Pa. 262.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.

